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Abstract
We introduce a new (ǫp, δp)-differentially private algorithm for the k-means clustering problem. Given
a dataset in Euclidean space, the k-means clustering problem requires one to find k points in that space
such that the sum of squares of Euclidean distances between each data point and its closest respective
point among the k returned is minimised. Although there exist privacy-preserving methods with good
theoretical guarantees to solve this problem ([4, 13]), in practice it is seen that it is the additive error
which dictates the practical performance of these methods. By reducing the problem to a sequence of
instances of maximum coverage on a grid, we are able to derive a new method that achieves lower additive
error then previous works. For input datasets with cardinality n and diameter ∆, our algorithm has an
O(∆2(k log2 n log(1/δp)/ǫp+k
√
d log(1/δp)/ǫp)) additive error whilst maintaining constant multiplicative
error. We conclude with some experiments and find an improvement over previously implemented work
for this problem.
1 Introduction
Clustering is a well-studied problem in theoretical computer science. The objective can vary between iden-
tifying good cluster sets, as one might desire in unsupervised learning, or good cluster centers, which may
be framed as more of an optimization problem. One relatively general variant of this problem is to find a
fixed number of centers k for a given dataset D of size n such that the sum of distances of each point to
the closest center is minimized. When the ambient space is Euclidean and the distance is the square of the
Euclidean metric this is known as the k-means problem. Although solving the k-means problem is NP hard
[3, 6, 16], practical algorithmic solutions with good approximation guarantees are well-known [15, 20, 12, 2].
When algorithms handle sensitive information (for example location data), an important requirement
that they might be expected to fulfill is that of being differentially private [8]. Differential privacy provides
a framework for capturing the loss in privacy that occurs when sensitive data is processed. This framework
encompasses different models that vary depending on who the trusted parties are, what is considered sensitive
data, and how loss in privacy is measured. In this work we are interested in the centralized model of
differential privacy, where we assume that the algorithm whose privacy loss we want to bound is executed
by a trusted curator with access to many agents’ private information. This trusted curator publicly reveals
the output obtained at the end of their computation, which is when all privacy loss occurs.
In the theoretical study of the k-means problem, reducing the worst-case multiplicative approximation
factor has been the focus of a major line of work [12, 2]. However, it is important to note that Lloyd’s algo-
rithm, which has a tight sub-optimal multiplicative guarantee of O(log k), works quite well in practice. This
behaviour can be understood by showing (as in [1]) that Lloyd’s finds a solution with constant multiplica-
tive error with constant probability, or that for a general class of datasets satisfying a certain separability
condition [20] the multiplicative error again has a strong O(1) bound.
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Reference Multiplicative Error Additive Error
Balcan et al. [4] O
(
log3 n
)
O˜
(
k2 + d
)
Kaplan and Stemmer [13] O(1/γ) O˜
(
k1.5 + d0.5+γk1+γ
)
Jones, Nguyen and Nguyen [11] O(1/γ) O˜
(
k + d0.5+γk1+γ
)
Ours O(1) O˜(k
√
d)
Table 1: Comparison of our clustering algorithms with prior works where we omit all log factors in the
additive error, the dependence on privacy parameters, set δp = 1/n
1.5 and suppress the common ∆2 factor
in the additive error.
In contrast, when the algorithm is required to be (ǫp, δp)-differentially private, no pure multiplicative
approximation is attainable and additive error is necessary. Differential privacy forces a lower bound on
the clustering cost - morally, for an easy clustering instance a perfect solution would reveal too much
information about the sensitive dataset. This is formalised for the closely related discrete k-medians1 problem
in theorem 4.4 of [10] which shows that there is a family of instances whose optimal clustering cost is 0 but
any differentially private algorithm must incur an Ω(∆2k(log n/k)/ǫp) expected cost. In practice, for many
datasets it is seen that although the non-private clustering cost naturally decreases as the number of centers
k increases, the costs incurred by differentially private algorithms quickly plateau (as in the experiments of
[4]), suggesting that they have reached their limit in the additive error. Given this fundamental barrier, a
major question is:
Question: Is it possible to obtain a finite approximation with additive error nearly linear in k?
1.1 Related work
The work [10] initiated the study of differentially private clustering algorithms and gave a private algorithm
for the k-means problem with constant factor multiplicative approximation and O˜(k1.5) additive error in
fixed dimensions. Motivated by applications in high dimensions, the work [4] developed a different method
that scales to high dimensions but with an O(log3 n) multiplicative approximation and O˜(k1.5) additive
error. Subsequently, the work [13] gave an algorithm with O(1/γ) approximation and O˜(k1.5 + k1+γd0.5+γ)
additive error with one key idea (among others) being the application of locality sensitive hashing (LSH).
The trade-off between the multiplicative and additive errors is in part a consequence of the trade-off between
the distance approximation quality of LSH and the number of hash functions. Recently, the work [11]
improved the additive error to O˜(k1+γd0.5+γ) but the multiplicative error remains O(1/γ). In this work, we
simultaneously improve upon the minimum additive error in this trade-off to nearly linear in k and eliminate
the resulting blow-up in the multiplicative factor using a very different approach.
1.2 Contributions
We introduce a differentially private k-means clustering algorithm for the global model of differential privacy.
This method has anO(1)multiplicative approximation and anO(∆2(k log2 n log(1/δp)/ǫp+k
√
d log(1/δp)/ǫp))
additive approximation guarantee. The additive error is nearly linear in k in contrast with a polynomial
in k overhead in previous works, and the multiplicative error is a constant, which is competitive with all
previous works. Apart from theoretical value, the algorithm also exhibits an improvement experimentally
over earlier work on synthetic and real-world datasets [4]. For a specific setting of parameters with constants
applicable for experiments, we have the following bound. More general asymptotic bounds can be found in
the subsequent sections.
1The discrete k-medians problem has an identical formulation to the k-means except that the distance function is a metric,
not squared, and the centers come from a public finite set and not the whole ambient space.
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Theorem 1.1. There is an (ǫp, δp) differentially private algorithm for the k-means problem that achieves a
utility bound of
O(1)fD(OPTD) +O
(
k∆2 log2 n log 1/δp
ǫp
)
+O
(
∆2k
√
d log 1/δp
ǫp
)
,
where D is the input dataset, fD(OPTD) is the optimal k-means cost for the input dataset D, d is the ambient
dimension of D, n is the cardinality of D, ∆ is the diameter of D, and the failure probability of the algorithm
is polynomially small in n.
For lower bounds, we extend the construction of [10] originally for the discrete k-medians problem to our
setting and show that a linear dependence on k in the additive error is necessary for any finite multiplicative
approximation.
Theorem 1.2. For any 0 < ǫp, δp ≤ 1 and integer k, there is a family of k-means instances over the
cube [0,∆/
√
d]d with d = O(ln(k/(ǫpδp))) dimensions such that the optimal clustering cost is 0 but any
(ǫp, δp)-differentially private algorithm would incur an expected cost of Ω
(
∆2k ln(ǫp/δp)
ǫp
)
.
The same construction also implies a lower bound for (ǫp, 0)-differential privacy.
Theorem 1.3. For any 0 < ǫp ≤ 1 and integers k and d = Ω(ln(k)), there is a family of k-means instances
over the cube [0,∆/
√
d]d such that the optimal clustering cost is 0 but any (ǫp, 0)-differentially private algo-
rithm would incur an expected cost of Ω
(
∆2kd
ǫp
)
.
In [10], the authors gave an algorithm for solving the discrete version of the problem and subsequent
works have focused on identifying a good discretization of the continuous domain and then invoking their
algorithm for the discrete case. A recent approach by [13] uses locality sensitive hashing (LSH) to identify a
small discrete set of points that serve as potential centers. Inherent in this approach is a trade-off between
the multiplicative approximation and the size of this discrete set, which comes from the trade-off in LSH
between the approximation and the number of hash functions. The number of discrete candidate centers
directly impacts the additive error and thereby brings about a trade-off between the multiplicative and
additive errors.
In this work, we avoid this trade-off by going back to the basics and using the most natural approach:
discretizing the space using a grid and using all grid points as candidate centers. We can preprocess the data
to reduce dimensions to O((log n)/ǫ2) and preserve all distances. However, there can be as many as (n)log n
many points in the grid that we construct since the grid size must start from 1/n for negligible additive
error. It is not clear how to implement a selection algorithm (such as the exponential mechanism) on such
a large number of choices. In fact, it was this hurdle, identified in [4], that prompted subsequent works to
find alternative approaches.
An important observation is that a large number of choices is not inherently difficult since it is not hard
to sample uniformly among them. Our task is nontrivial since the k-means cost objective is a complex
function. To simplify the sampling weights, we exploit the connection between clustering and coverage and
reduce the problem to finding maximum coverage: count the number of data points within a given radius
of each candidate center. The notable advantage is that in maximum coverage, the value of each center is
an integer in the range from 1 to n instead of a real number corresponding to a potential improvement in
the k-means cost. The centers can hence be partitioned into n classes and we just need to sample uniformly
among them. The crucial observation is that there are at most nO(1/ǫ
4) grid points within the threshold
radius of any data point, meaning that there are only a polynomial number of grid points with non-zero
coverage. Thus, all but a polynomial number of choices have the same coverage of 0 making it possible to
implement the exponential mechanism in polynomial time.
Given the implementation of the exponential mechanism for coverage, we follow the approach of [11] to
cover the points using clusters of increasing radii. Note that the approach goes back to the non-private
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coreset construction of [5]. However, the use of coverage for dealing with each radius has another crucial
advantage: like in [11], using the technique of [10], the privacy loss only increases by a log 1/δp factor even
though the algorithm has Ω(k) adaptive rounds of exponential mechanism.
To obtain a comparable coverage to the optimal solution at each radius r, we use a bi-criteria relaxation
of maximum coverage and pick many more cluster centers than in the optimal solution. We increase r
multiplicatively with factor (1 + ǫ) from 1/n to the diameter 2 and invoke this subroutine for each such r,
taking the union of all O( log nǫ ) sets of candidate centers generated this way to generate a set C of “good"
centers derived from many grids.
By moving each point p ∈ D′ to its closest candidate center grid[p] in C (with some additional noise), we
end up privately constructing a proxy dataset D′′ with total movement of data points on the order of the
k-means cost (by virtue of C containing a good k-means solution for D′).∑
p∈D′
d(p, grid[p]) ≃ cost(D′)
By the triangle inequality, this bound on the total movement means that any k-means solution for D′′ is
immediately a good k-means solution for the dataset D′ as well, with a constant multiplicative overhead in
the cost. A k-means solution can be constructed for D′′ using any non-private k-means clustering algorithm,
and finally D can be clustered by using noisy averages of clusters in D′.
We are able to use a parsimonious privacy budget primarily because of the round independent privacy
analysis for the grid-based proxy construction routine using the exponential mechanism which behaves well
under composition. There are other privacy preserving noise additions when snapping the data points to the
grid for the proxy dataset construction and the final cluster centers but apart from a
√
d dependence on the
ambient dimension they are dominated by the privacy expenditure of the exponential mechanism.
We finish with an experimental evaluation of our algorithm, in which we find that this method performs
better than an implementation of previous work [4].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Objective function
We are given a dataset D of n points that lies in a ball B∆/2(0) (the ball of radius ∆/2 centered at 0) in some
high dimensional space Rd. The goal is to find a set of k points S = {µ1, . . . , µk} such that
∑
p∈D d(p, S) is
minimal. Here d(·, ·) : Rd×Rd → R is the square of the Euclidean distance, that is d(p, q) :=∑di=1(pi− qi)2.
We abuse notation to set d(p, S) := minµ∈S d(p, µ). We define
fD(S) =
∑
p∈D
d(p, S),
so when S is a set of size k, fD(S) is the k-means cost of the solution S for the dataset D.
2.2 Differential privacy
There are a couple of closely related definitions of central differential privacy which can be trivially related
to each other. For clarity we disambiguate the situation by uniformly adhering to the formalization in [9].
Definition 2.1. We say that two datasets D,D′ ∈ Xn are neighbouring if |D△D′| = 1, i.e. there is exactly
one element in their symmetric difference. We say that an algorithm A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for
any two neighbouring input datasets D,D′ and any measurable output set S lying in the co-domain of A,
P (A(D) ∈ S) ≤ eǫP (A(D′) ∈ S) + δ.
We now mention some standard tools from the literature of differential privacy.
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Lemma 2.2 (Exponential Mechanism, [17]). Let input set D ⊂ X, range R, and utility function q : X×R→
R. The Exponential Mechanism ME(D, q, ǫE) with privacy parameter ǫE outputs an element r ∈ R sampled
according to the distribution
P (ME(D, q, ǫE) = r) := exp
(
ǫE · q(D, r)
2∆q
)
,
where ∆q is the sensitivity of the utility q; i.e.
∆q = max
r∈R
|A∆B|=1
|q(A, r) − q(B, r)|.
The Exponential Mechanism is (ǫE , 0)-differentially private and with probability at least 1− γ,
|max
r∈R
q(D, r)− q(D,ME(D, q, ǫE))| ≤ 2∆q
ǫE
log
( |R|
γ
)
.
Lemma 2.3 (Laplace mechanism, [8]). Given any function f : N|X| → Rk, the Laplace mechanism with
privacy parameter ǫL is defined as
ML(x, f(·), ǫL) := f(x) + (Y1, . . . , Yk)
where Yi are i.i.d. ∼ Lap
(
∆f
ǫL
)
, Lap(x|b) = 12b exp
(
− |x|b
)
and ∆f = max|X△Y |=1|f(X) − f(Y )|, i.e. the
ℓ1 sensitivity of f over all pairs of neighbouring datasets. The Laplace mechanism is (ǫL, 0)-differentially
private.
Theorem 2.4 (Basic composition, [7]). If a sequence of algorithms Mi with (ǫi, δi)-differential privacy
guarantees are composed in order then the composite process satisfies (
∑m
i=1 ǫi,
∑m
i=1 δi)-differential privacy.
We state the parallel composition theorem from [18], slightly modifying the proof to extend this result
to be able to use (ǫ, δ)-differentially private subroutines where δ 6= 0.
Theorem 2.5 (Parallel composition, [18]). Let Mi each provide (ǫi, δi)-differential privacy. Let {Di : i ∈ Λ}
be arbitrary disjoint subsets of the input domain D. For input dataset X, the sequence of Mi(X∩Di) provides
(maxi ǫi,maxi δi)differential privacy.
Proof. Let A and B be neighbouring datasets, Ai = A ∩ Di and Bi = B ∩ Di for i ∈ Λ. Let Mi be (ǫi, δi)
differentially private subroutines for i ∈ Λ. Since |A△B| = 1, there is at most one partition set Di∗ of the
domain such that Ai∗ 6= Bi∗. We bound the ratio of probabilities of the output tuple as
P ((Mi(Ai))i∈Λ = (Si)i∈Λ)
P ((Mi(Bi))i∈Λ = (Si)i∈Λ)
=
∏
i∈Λ
P (Mi(Ai) = Si
P (Mi(Bi) = Si
=
P (Mi∗(Ai∗) = Si∗)
P (Mi∗(Bi∗) = Si∗)
Since Mi∗ is (ǫi∗ , δi∗)-differentially private, it follows that with probability 1 − δi∗ , this ratio is bounded by
exp(ǫ∗i ). Since this is true for every pair of neighbouring datasets, we can summarise this by saying that this
sequence of operations is (maxi ǫi,maxi δi)- differentially private.
2.3 Private averaging
Here we describe the noisy averaging algorithm from [19] which we use in the last step to derive cluster
centers privately from cluster IDs and data without revealing the cluster member vectors or the cluster size.
The authors of that work use the Gaussian mechanism in conjunction with a bound on the sensitivity of the
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averaging operator and addition of Laplace noise to the number of points in the cluster to ensure privacy.
This additional step of adding Laplace noise is necessary because in this setting the cluster sizes are derived
from sensitive information, and since the Gaussian noise added to mask the exact mean depends upon the
cluster size, the noise parameter must itself be masked by additional noise (which is data-independent).
In [19], the authors use a slightly different definition of privacy where datasets D,D′ are considered
neighboring if D = D′\{p} ∪ {p′} for some p ∈ D′. The statements here are with the privacy parameters
modified to fit the definition of differential privacy that we are working with; ∆ is any upper bound on the
diameter of the input set.
Data: Multiset V of vectors in Rd, predicate g, parameters ǫ, δ
1 Set mˆ = |{v ∈ V : g(v) = 1}|+ Lap(5/ǫ)− 5ǫ ln(2/δ). If mˆ < 0, output a uniformly random point in
the domain B∆/2(0).
2 Denote σ = 5∆4ǫmˆ
√
2 ln(3.5/δ), and let η ∈ Rd be a random noise vector with each coordinate sampled
independently from N(0, σ2).
3 return g(V ) + η
Algorithm 1: NoisyAVG[19, Algorithm 5]
Theorem 2.6 (Privacy [19, Theorem A.3] and noise [19, Observation A.1] bounds for algorithm 1). Al-
gorithm 1 is an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private algorithm for ǫ ≤ 1/3. Further, if V and g are such that
m = |{v ∈ V : g(v) = 1}| ≥ A
(
1
ǫ ln
(
1
βδ
))
for sufficiently large constant A, then with probability 1 − β,
algorithm 1 returns g(V ) + η where η is a vector where every coordinate is sampled i.i.d. from N(0, σ2) for
some σ ≤ 4∆ǫm
√
2 ln(8/δ), where ∆ is the diameter of the input set.
2.4 Other technical tools
In this subsection we list some technical lemmata that we will find useful to refer to in the main body of
this work.
Lemma 2.7 (Greedy set cover bicriteria solution guarantee). Let there be a set of elements U , a family of
sets S ⊂ 2U , and the promise that there is some subfamily of sets Z ⊂ S that covers U . Suppose that for
Y = 2⌈|Z| log 1/ǫ⌉ + 1 we iteratively pick a collection of sets C = {c1, . . . , cY } ⊂ S. We denote the set of
elements not picked by the ith iteration U1 = U and Ui = Ui−1\ci−1. If ci ∩ Ui is at least half as big as
maxc∈S(c ∩ Ui) for all i, then S will cover (1− ǫ) of all elements in U . Formally, if
C = {ci : ci ∈ S, i = 1, . . . , ⌈2|Z| log 1/ǫ⌉},
Ui = U\(c1 ∪ · · · ∪ ci−1)
where
|ci ∩ Ui| ≥
max
c∈S
(c ∩ Ui)
2
,
then |⋃i ci| ≥ (1− ǫ)|U |.
Proof. The idea behind this proof is simple; it suffices to show that in every iteration we always cover a
certain fraction of the thus far uncovered elements. Telescoping this multiplicative guarantee will give us our
desired result. Formally, we know that since
⋃
z∈Z z = U , the union
⋃
z∈Z z also covers the set of unpicked
elements Ui−1. Enumerating the elements of Ui by summing the cardinalities of its intersections with the
members of Z, we get ∑
z∈Z
|z ∩ Ui−1| = |Ui−1|
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⇒ max
z∈Z
|z ∩ Ui−1| ≥ |Ui−1||Z|
⇒ |ci ∩ Ui−1| ≥ |Ui−1|
2 |Z|
⇒ |ci| ≥ |Ui−1|
2 |Z|
Since Ui−1 = Ui ⊔ ci,
|Ui| ≤
(
1− 1
2|Z|
)
|Ui−1|
⇒ |Ui| ≤
(
1− 1
2|Z|
)i−1
|U |
It follows that for
i− 1 > log1− 1
2|Z|
ǫ =
log ǫ
log 1− 12|Z|
>
log ǫ
− 12|Z|
= 2|Z| log 1/ǫ,
|UY | < ǫ|U | and so the size of the complement |c1 ∪ · · · ∪ cY | is ≥ (1 − ǫ)|U |.
Lemma 2.8. In any metric space with a metric d(·, ·) and p ≥ 1, dp(a, b) ≤ 2p−1(dp(a, c) + dp(c, b)).
Proof. Applying Jensen’s inequality with the function g(x) = xp we have(
d(a, c)
2
+
d(c, b)
2
)p
≤ d
p(a, c) + dp(c, b)
2
.
Since d is a metric, by the triangle inequality
d(a, b) ≤ d(a, c) + d(c, b)
⇒ d
p(a, b)
2p
≤
(
d(a, c)
2
+
d(c, b)
2
)p
≤ d
p(a, c) + dp(c, b)
2
⇒ dp(a, b) ≤ 2p−1(dp(a, c) + dp(c, b))
Lemma 2.9 (Concentration bound for privacy analysis, [10]). Let R1, . . . , Rn be some Bernoulli random
variables, Ri ∼ Ber(pi), i.e. Ri = 1 with probability pi and 0 with probability 1 − pi, where Ri may depend
arbitrarily on R1, . . . Ri−1. Let Zj =
∏j
i=1(1−Ri). Then
P
(
n∑
i=1
piZi > q
)
≤ exp(−q).
3 Lower bounds
Following the construction in theorem 4.4 of [10], we derive lower bounds for the k-means clustering problem
in the (ǫ, δ) and (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy regimes.
Theorem 3.1. For any 0 < ǫp, δp ≤ 1 and integer k, there is a family of k-means instances over the
cube [0,∆/
√
d]d with d = O(ln(k/(ǫpδp))) dimensions such that the optimal clustering cost is 0 but any
(ǫp, δp)-differentially private algorithm would incur an expected cost of Ω
(
∆2k ln(ǫp/δp)
ǫp
)
.
7
Proof. Let the ambient dimension d = Θ(ln(k/((eǫp − 1)δp)) and W be the set of codewords of an error
correcting code with constant rate and constant relative distance in {0, 1}d. The dimension d and codewords
W are chosen so that |W | ≥ k/((eǫp−1)δp). Let L = ln((eǫp−1)/(4δp))/(2ǫp). Our input domain is the unit
cube [0, 1]d with diameter ∆ =
√
d. Note that for other values of ∆, we can simply re-scale the construction.
Suppose M is an arbitrary (ǫp, δp)-differentially private algorithm that on input D ⊂ [0, 1]d outputs a set
of k locations. Let M ′ be the algorithm that first runs M on the input and then snaps each output point to
the nearest point in W . By post-processing, M ′ is (ǫp, δp)-differentially private. Furthermore, observe that
if the input points are located at a subset of W then the cost of M ′ is within a factor 4 of the cost of M .
Let A be a size k subset of W chosen uniformly at random and the dataset DA is a multiset containing each
point in A with multiplicity L. Note that the optimal cost for DA is 0.
We would like to analyze φ = EA,M ′ [|A ∩M ′(DA)|]/k. We have:
kφ = E
A,M ′
[∑
i∈A
1i∈M ′(DA)
]
= k E
A,M ′
E
i∈A
[1i∈M ′(DA)]
= k E
i∈W
E
A,M ′
[1i∈M ′(DA)|i ∈ A]
Let i′ be an random point in W not in A. Changing A to A′ = A \ {i} ∪ {i′} requires changing 2L elements
of DA. Notice that for random A\{i} in W \{i} and random i′ in W \A, we have that A′ is still a uniformly
random subset of W \ {i}. Thus,
E
i∈W
E
A′,M ′
[1i∈M ′(DA′ )|i 6∈ A′] ≥
(
E
i∈W
E
A,M ′
[1i∈M ′(DA)|i ∈ A]
)
exp(−ǫp · 2L)− δp
eǫp − 1
Here we use the fact that M ′ is (ǫp, δp)-differentially private, and that the δp losses in expectation decrease
geometrically with factor exp(−ǫp) so the net leakage from the δ term can be lower bounded by the sum of
an infinite geometric progression. Continuing,
E
i∈W
E
A′,M ′
[1i∈M ′(DA′ )] ≥ φ exp(−ǫp · 2L)− δp/(eǫp − 1)
≥ 4φδp/(eǫp − 1)− δp/(eǫp − 1)
Since the output M ′(DA′) has at most k points, the LHS is at most k/|W |. Thus, φ ≤ (k/|W |+δp/(eǫp−
1))/(4δp/(e
ǫp − 1)) ≤ 1/2.
For each point in A \M ′(DA), the algorithm incurs a cost of Θ(L∆2) due to the multiplicity of L of
points in DA and the fact that all points in W are at distance Θ(∆) apart. Therefore, the expected cost of
M ′, and consequently the cost of M , is Ω(kL∆2) = Ω
(
∆2k ln(ǫp/δp)
ǫp
)
.
By the same proof, one can also obtain a lower bound for (ǫp, 0)-differential privacy.
Theorem 3.2. For any 0 < ǫp ≤ 1 and integers k and d = Ω(ln(k)), there is a family of k-means instances
over the cube [0,∆/
√
d]d such that the optimal clustering cost is 0 but any (ǫp, 0)-differentially private algo-
rithm would incur an expected cost of Ω
(
∆2kd
ǫp
)
.
Proof. Let W be the set of codewords of an error correcting code with constant relative rate and constant
relative distance in {0, 1}d. Note that |W | = 2Ω(d). Let L = ln(|W |/(2k))/(2ǫp). Our input domain is
the unit cube [0, 1]d with diameter ∆ =
√
d. Note that for other values of ∆, we can simply re-scale the
construction.
Suppose M is an arbitrary (ǫp, 0)-differentially private algorithm that on input D ⊂ [0, 1]d outputs a set
of k locations. Let M ′ be the algorithm that first runs M on the input and then snaps each output point to
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the nearest point in W . By post-processing, M ′ is (ǫp, 0)-differentially private. Furthermore, observe that if
the input points are located at a subset of W then the cost of M ′ is within a factor 4 of the cost of M . Let
A be a size k subset of W chosen uniformly at random and the dataset DA is a multiset containing each
point in A with multiplicity L. Note that the optimal cost for DA is 0.
We would like to analyze φ = EA,M ′ [|A ∩M ′(DA)|]/k. We have:
kφ = E
A,M ′
[∑
i∈A
1i∈M ′(DA)
]
= k E
i∈W
E
A,M ′
[1i∈M ′(DA)|i ∈ A]
Let i′ be an arbitrary point in W not in A. Changing A to A′ = A \ {i}∪{i′} requires changing 2L elements
of DA. Thus,
E
i∈W
E
A′,M ′
[1i∈M ′(DA′ )] ≥ φ exp(−ǫp · 2L)
Since the outputM ′(DA′) has at most k points, the LHS is at most k/|W |. Thus, φ ≤ (k/|W |) exp(2Lǫp) ≤
1/2.
For each point in A \M ′(DA), the algorithm incurs a cost of Θ(L∆2) due to the multiplicity of L of
points in DA and the fact that all points in W are at distance Θ(∆) apart. Therefore, the expected cost of
M ′, and consequently the cost of M , is Ω(kL∆2) = Ω
(
∆2kd
ǫp
)
.
4 Algorithm
We introduce some notation to make the analysis of algorithms 2 and 3 easier.
• OPTD, optimal solution: We let OPTD be the lexicographically minimal optimal k-means set for the
dataset D. The lexicographic minimality is just for uniqueness, it has no other significance.
• ǫ, multiplicative approximation constant: We let ǫ be an approximation constant that is used in the
Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform and such that 1 + ǫ is the factor the grid unit length and threshold
increase by in each iteration of the loop on line 8 to line 12. We will require that ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and be
bounded away from 1, say ǫ ≤ 0.5.
• m, number of iterations: We let m = ⌈log1+ǫ 2n⌉, the total number of iterations for which algorithm 3
is called.
• ri, threshold radii: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we let ri = ti
√
d
ǫ =
(1+ǫ)i−1
n , the ith threshold radius used for
computing the max cover bi-criteria relaxation. For notational convenience we set r0 = 0, and note
that r increases geometrically from r1 =
1
n to rm = 2.
• Gi, ti, grid and unit length: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we let Gi = {−1,−1 + ti,−1 + 2ti, . . . , 1 − ti, 1}d′,
where ti =
ǫ
n
√
d
(1 + ǫ)i−1, the grid unit length in the ith iteration. Note that |Gi| = ⌊ 1ti ⌋d
′
.
• ⌊·⌋(i), floor to grid function: We let ⌊v⌋(i) for any vector v ∈ Rd denote ((ti⌊ v1ti ⌋), . . . , (ti⌊
vd′
ti
⌋)), i.e.
⌊v⌋(i) is the coordinate-wise “floor" of v in the grid of unit length ti.
• oi, ideal thresholded objectives: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we let oi = {p ∈ D′ : d(p, OPTD′) ∈ [ri−1, ri)}.
Since D′ ⊂ B1(0), D′ = ⊔mi=1oi
• ai, set of points covered in ith call: For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we let ai = Bri+ti√d′(Ci) ∩D′ where Ci is the
set of points returned by algorithm 3 when called in the ith iteration of algorithm 2.
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• Br(·): We let Br(S) be the union of all balls of radius r whose center is an element of S. We abuse
notation to let Br(g) := Br({g}) and observe that |Br(·)| is a monotonic positive submodular function
for any r ≥ 0, as is |T ∩Br(·)|, for any fixed set T .
• cover: We let cover[g] denote that set of uncovered data points that are covered within the radius
(ri + ti
√
d′) around g in the ith call to algorithm 3. This is a subset of the data points in B(1+ǫ)ri
• grid: We let grid[p] denote the grid point that covers p in the call to algorithm 3 that removes p from
D′1.
• center: We let center[p] denote the closest element of OPTD′ to the datapoint p ∈ D′.
At a high level the algorithm can be described in four steps.
Step 1: First the dataset D ⊂ B(0,Λ/2) ⊂ Rd is preprocessed via dimension reduction, scaling and
projection to produce a dataset D′ ⊂ B1(0) ⊂ Rd′ where d = O((log n)/ǫ2). Note that with high probability
we do not need to project any point and so need not account for it in the privacy analysis; however, by
projecting instead of re-scaling, we preserve privacy. To start with a finite number of candidate centers we
construct multi-dimensional grids of side lengths ti and observe that if µ is a center of a cluster with radius
ri in the optimal solution, then by the triangle inequality a ball of radius ri + ti
√
d′ centered at ⌊µ⌋(i) (the
“floor" of µ the in grid) contains all the points of the same cluster.
Step 2: Next, for geometrically increasing grid unit lengths ti with growth factor (1 + ǫ) starting from
ǫ/n
√
d′ and increasing to 2/
√
d′ we create grids and identify possible centers of clusters with radius in the
interval [ri−1, ri). This is done by counting the number of datapoints within ri + ti
√
d′ of every grid point.
To ensure a polynomial time method this enumeration is done by iterating over datapoints and adding each
datapoint to the grid points which could be valid cluster centers - we do this by keeping in hand a set of
valid offsets Vi and simply incrementing counts for all grid points within an offset of ⌊p⌋(i). Since we are
looking for a k-means solution there could be as many as k clusters for any given radius, which requires us
to greedily identify the k/ǫ best grid points to obtain close to optimal coverage (see lemma 2.7). We take
the union of all log1+ǫ 2/(1/n) = O((log n)/ǫ) sets of k/ǫ points so found to construct the set C.
Step 3: Once this set C containing a good cluster solution is identified, the idea is to construct the proxy
dataset D′′ by moving each point to its closest point in C. However, constructing the proxy dataset in this
way means accessing the sensitive data again. In order to maintain privacy in this step, instead of directly
moving datapoints to points in C, we compute the counts nc of the number of datapoints that would ideally
be moved to c and add Laplace noise to nc to get n˜c. D
′′ then contains n˜c copies of c for all c ∈ C.
Step 4: In the final step we apply any non-private k-means clustering algorithm to D′′ to get some cluster
centers S′′. We cluster D′ using these cluster centers to get clusters C′, and define final clusters for D
by identifying points with their images under the Johnson Lindenstrauss map. Since this step again uses
sensitive data we use the Gaussian mechanism to return noisy averages of these clusters C′ for the dataset
D to derive the set of k-means S.
The formal pseudocode algorithm 3 requires some additional justification; the construction of the offset
set Vi, and the polynomial time implementation of the exponential mechanism.
Claim 4.1. A data point p is within distance ri + ti
√
d′ of a grid point tib for b ∈ Zd′ only if
d′∑
j=1
min((⌊p⌋(i)j − tibj)2, (⌊p⌋(i)j − ti(bj + 1))2) ≤ (ri + ti
√
d′)2.
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Data: D ⊂ Rd dataset, |D′| = n.
Result: S = {µ˜1, . . . , µ˜k} ⊂ Rd
1 T ∼ JohnsonLindenstrauss(n, ǫ)
2 D′ ← T (D)
3 d′ ← dim(T ) = O((log n)/ǫ2)
4 Scale D′ down by a factor of ∆2(1+ǫ) and project to B1(0)
5 Let T ′ be the composition of T with the scaling and projection so that T ′(D) = D′
6 r1 ← 1/n
7 t1 ← ǫ/(n
√
d′)
8 for i = 1, . . . ,m = ⌈log1+ǫ 2n⌉ do
9 Ci ← algorithm 3(D′, ti, ri)
10 ri+1 ← (1 + ǫ)ri.
11 ti+1 ← (1 + ǫ)ti.
12 end
13 D′ ← T ′(D) ; // resetting the dataset to account for points lost in call to
algorithm 3
14 C =
⋃m
i=1 Ci
15 Assign all points in D′ to their closest point c ∈ C
16 Let nc be the number of points in D
′ assigned to c
17 For each c ∈ C set n′c = nc + Lap
(
1
ǫL
)
18 Let D′′ be the dataset where every c ∈ C is repeated n′c times
19 S′′ = {µ′′1 , . . . , µ′′k} ← Lloyd(D′′)
20 D′i ← {p ∈ D′ : argminµ′′∈S′′ d(p, µ′′) = µ′′i } for i = 1, . . . , k
21 for i = 1, . . . , k do
22 µ˜i = algorithm 1(D, 1D′i , ǫG, δG) ; // 1D′i(p) indicates whether T
′(p) ∈ D′i for p ∈ D
23 end
24 return S˜ = {µ˜1, . . . , µ˜k}
Algorithm 2: Private k-means
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Data: D′ dataset (passed by reference), ti grid unit length, ri threshold radius
Result: set Ci ⊂ Gi
1 Ci ← ∅
2 repeat k′ times
3 cover ← empty linked list
4 Vi ← {v : v ∈ Nd′ ,
∑d′
j=1(tivj)
2 < (ri + ti
√
d′)2}
5 for all p ∈ D′ do
6 for all v ∈ Vi do
7 for all s ∈ {0, 1}d′ do
8 tib = ⌊p⌋(i) + tis+ (2s− 1¯)tiv ; // where 1¯ is the all-ones vector
9 if d(tib, p) < (ri + ti
√
d′)2 then
10 cover[tib] += {p}
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 totalCover← 0
16 for g ∈ cover do
17 totalCover += exp
(
ǫE |cover[g]|
2
)
18 end
19 totalCover += |Gi| − len[cover]
20 Let Psamp = 1− |Gi|totalCover .
21 if Ber (Psamp) = 1 then
22 g ← pick i ∈ [len[cover]] ∼ P (g) ∝ exp
(
ǫE |cover[g]|
2
)
− 1
23 else
24 g ← pick i uniformly at random from Gi
25 end
26 Ci ← Ci ∪ {g}
27 D′ ← D′\cover[g]
28 end
29 return Ci
Algorithm 3: Private grid set cover
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Let Vi = {v : v ∈ Nd′ ,
∑d′
j=1 t
2
i v
2
j < (ri+ ti
√
d′)2}. If tib is a grid point such that d(p, tib) < (ri+ ti
√
d′)2 then
for some s ∈ {0, 1}d and v ∈ Vi, tib = ⌊p⌋(i) + tis+ (2s − 1¯)tiv, where 1¯ = (1, 1, . . . , 1), the d′-dimensional
all-ones vector.
Proof. Informally, pj is a real number and the tibj lie on regularly spaced intervals on the number line. Since
⌊p⌋(i)j and ⌊p⌋(i)j + ti are the two closest grid points to p, any grid point must be closer to one of these
neighbours than it is to pj .
If p is within distance ri + ti
√
d′ of a grid point tib for b ∈ Zd′ then by definition
d′∑
j=1
(pj − tibj)2 ≤ (ri + ti
√
d′)2.
If pj ≥ tibj then pj = tibj + tix+ y for some x ∈ N and y ∈ [0, 1). Since ⌊p⌋(i)j = tibj + tix, (⌊p⌋(i)j − tibj)2 <
(pj−tibj)2. Else, if pj < tibj then pj = tibj−tix−y, with same ranges for x and y. Then ⌊p⌋(i)j +ti = tibj−tix
so (⌊p⌋(i)j − tibj + ti)2 < (pj − tibj)2. Therefore we have that min((⌊p⌋(i)j − tibj)2, (⌊p⌋(i)j − ti(bj + 1))2) <
(pj − tibj)2. Summing up this inequality over the index j and using the display above gives us the desired
result.
Let sj = 0 if pj ≥ tibj and sj = 1 if pj < tibj. Tracing the proof of the first half and letting v be such
that tivj = min((⌊p⌋(i)j − tibj)2, (⌊p⌋(i)j − ti(bj + 1))2), it follows that tibj = ⌊p⌋(i)j + tisj + (2sj − 1)vj for all
j ∈ [k]. Putting together all coefficients this gives us that tib = ⌊p⌋(i)+ tis+(2s− 1¯)tiv for some v ∈ Vi.
Claim 4.2. After computing the cover of each grid point, algorithm 3 executes the exponential mechanism
correctly and in polynomial time.
Proof. First we note that there are at most polynomially many grid points whose cover is updated in
any call to algorithm 3. From claim 4.1 we know that for any data point the only grid points whose
cover must be updated lie in Vi. It will hence suffice to show that |Vi| < nO(1/ǫ4). To get the number
of unsigned d′-dimensional ordered tuples v for which
∑
i t
2
i v
2
i < (ri + ti
√
d′)2 ⇔ ∑i v2i < d′(1ǫ + 1)2, it
suffices to count the number of ways of partitioning d′(1ǫ + 1)
2 + d′ + 1 balls into d′ + 1 distinguishable
bins. We can do this by placing the balls in a line and choosing d′ gaps between them. It follows that
|V | = 2d′(d′( 1ǫ+1)2+d′+1
d′+1
)
= O
(
2
d′
ǫ2
)
< nO(1/ǫ
4), using that d′ = O
(
logn
ǫ2
)
.
To execute the exponential mechanism, we want that the grid point g ∈ Gi be sampled with the probability
P (g) given by the expression
P (g) =
exp
(
ǫE |cover[g]|
2
)
∑
h∈Gi exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
) .
Since all but polynomially many grid points {g : cover[g] = 0} are being sampled with exactly the same
probability, which also happens to be the smallest value any point is sampled with, we can use the law of
total probability to write this sampling distribution as a uniform distribution on the entire grid with some
probability 1 − Psamp, and a second distribution with P ′ supported only on the polynomially many grid
points with non-zero cover with probability Psamp.
P (g) = PsampP
′(g) + (1 − Psamp) 1|Gi|
Letting g0 be any grid point with cover[g0] = ∅, so that P ′(g0) = 0,
(1− Psamp) 1|Gi| =
1∑
h∈Gi exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
)
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⇒ Psamp = 1− |Gi|∑
h∈G exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
)
Putting together the last 3 displays, we get an expression for P ′(g):
PsampP
′(g) =
exp
(
ǫE |cover[g]|
2
)
− 1∑
h∈G exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
)
⇒ P ′(g) =
exp
(
ǫE |cover[g]|
2
)
− 1∑
h∈Gi exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
)
∑
h∈G exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
)
∑
h∈Gi exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
)
− |Gi|
=
exp
(
ǫE|cover[g]|
2
)
− 1∑
h∈Gi exp
(
ǫE |cover[h]|
2
)
− |Gi|
Suppressing the normalization, the derived expression can be summarised as P ′(g) ∝ exp
(
ǫE|cover[g]|
2
)
−1.
5 Utility
The outline of the utility analysis is as follows; we know that the optimal k-means solution OPTD′ leads to
k clusters, each of which has some radius between 0 and 1. We will try to catch these clusters at threshold
radii r1 = (1/n), r2 = (1 + ǫ)(1/n), r3 = (1 + ǫ)
2(1/n), . . . , rm = 2 for i = 1, . . .m = log1+ǫ 2n. If oi is
the number of points in D′ such that for all p ∈ oi, d(p,D′) ∈ [ri−1, ri), then we can relate the cost of the
optimal k-means solution as
∑m
i=1|oi|ri
1 + ǫ
≤ fD′(OPTD′) <
m∑
i=1
|oi|ri.
We show that the sets ai, i.e. the set of points covered within ri + ti
√
d′ is close to the number of points
that lie within ri of their closest mean in OPTD′ (lemma 5.1). It will then follow that moving each data
point to its closest point in C = ∪mi=1Ci will lead to moving datapoints a total distance of ∼ fD′(OPTD′)
(lemma 5.2). Similarly it will also follow that the proxy dataset D′′ constructed by enumerating points in C
with multiplicity the number of points moved to them will have a similar clustering cost (lemma 5.5), and
that cluster centers for D′′ also work well as cluster centers for D′(lemma 5.7). We identify points in D with
their images in D′ under T ′ and show that noisy averaging of clusters in D so found gives us a good solution
for the k-means problem for D (theorem 5.9).
Lemma 5.1. With probability 1− γ
|al| ≥ (1 − ǫ) |ol| −O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
.
where ǫE is the privacy parameter used in the exponential mechanism.
Proof. Since the ℓ2 distance between µ and ⌊µ⌋(l) is at most tl
√
d′, it follows from the definition of ol that
ol ⊂ Brl+tl√d′({⌊µ⌋ : µ ∈ OPTD′}). We can hence apply lemma 2.7 with the promise that the set of k balls
with centers in {argming∈G′ d(g, c) : c ∈ OPTD′} and radii rl + tl
√
d′ cover the set ol, and that the k balls lie
in the family of sets {Brl+tl√d′(g) : g ∈ Gl}.
We let h denote the submodular function |ol ∩Btl+rl√d(·)| and ∆ih denote the marginal utility function,
i.e. the increase in h when picking the ith element from the domain and adding it to the set of i−1 elements
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already picked. If gEMi is the ith element picked by the exponential mechanism, the lemma 2.2 guarantee
gives us that with probability 1− γ,
∆ih(g
EM
i ) ≥ max
g∈Gl\{gEM1 ,...,gEMi−1 }
∆ih(g)− 2
ǫE
log
|Gl|
γ
.
This implies that when
max
g∈Gl\{gEM1 ,...,gEMi−1 }
∆ih(g) ≥ 4
ǫE
log
|Gl|
γ
,
with probability 1− γ,
∆ih(g
EM
i ) ≥
max
g∈Gl\{gEM1 ,...,gEMi−1 }
∆ih(g)
2
. (1)
Let gEM1 , . . . , g
EM
k′ be the grid points chosen by the exponential mechanism in the course of algorithm 3.
Note that this implies
Bri+ti
√
d′({gEM1 , . . . , gEMk′ }) ∩ ol ⊂ al
⇒ h({gEM1 , . . . , gEMk′ }) ≤ |al|. (2)
If j is the greatest index for which max
g∈Gl\{gEM1 ,...,gEMi−1 }
∆jh(g) ≥ 4ǫE log
|Gl|
γ (noting that the maximum possible
marginal increase in cover is non-increasing), then let gMAXj+1 , . . . , g
MAX
k′ be the grid points with maximal
marginal utility in the round indicated by the subscript. Combining lemma 2.7 with eq. (1) gives us that
with probability at least 1− jγ ≥ 1− k′γ
h({gEM1 , . . . , gEMj , gMAXj+1 , . . . , gMAXk′ }) ≥ (1− ǫ)|ol|
⇒
j∑
i=1
∆ih(g
EM
i ) +
k′∑
i=j+1
∆ih(g
MAX
i ) ≥ (1− ǫ)|ol|
⇒
j∑
i=1
∆ih(g
EM
i ) +
k′∑
i=j+1
4
ǫE
log
|Gl|
γ
≥ (1− ǫ)|ol|
⇒ h({gEM1 , . . . , gEMk′ }) +
4k′
ǫE
log
|Gl|
γ
≥ (1− ǫ)|ol|
We recall that |Gl| is
⌊
1
tl
⌋d′
, and that tl is at least
ǫ
n
√
d′
. Using this, and eq. (2), we see that with probability
1− k′γ,
|al| ≥ (1− ǫ) |ol| −O
(
k′d′
ǫE
log
n
√
d′
γǫ
)
.
We absorb the k′ = kǫ factor into the failure probability γ and noting that d
′ = O
(
logn
ǫ2
)
, k′ = kǫ and k < n
gives us
|al| ≥ (1 − ǫ) |ol| −O
(
k logn
ǫ3 · ǫE log
kn
√
logn
γǫ3
)
≥ (1 − ǫ) |ol| −O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
.
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We see that although the cluster radii thresholds are ri for i = 1 . . .m, discretization leads to slightly
inflated cluster radii ri + ti
√
d = (1 + ǫ)ri. This also leads to a slight multiplicative inflation in the total
movement, showing up as the (1 + ǫ) coefficient of
∑m
i=1|ai|ri in the following result bounding the total
movement of points when constructing the proxy dataset D′′ (without addition of noise).
Lemma 5.2. The total movement of points p ∈ D′ to the closest point grid[p] ∈ C is bounded by the following
inequalities
∑
p∈D′
d(p, grid[p]) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri ≤
(
1 +
3ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
fD′(OPTD′) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
.
We break this proof down into a couple of smaller steps.
Lemma 5.3. The thresholded cost obeys the bound
m∑
i=1
|oi|ri ≤ (1 + ǫ)fD′(OPTD′) + 1. (3)
Proof. We recall that oi = {p ∈ D′ : d(p, OPTD′) ∈ [ri−1, ri)}. Since D′ ∈ B1(0), and rm = 2, ∪mi=1ai = D′.
From this we have that
f(OPTD′) =
m∑
i=1
∑
p∈oi
d(p, OPTD′)
=
∑
p∈o1
d(p, OPT) +
m∑
i=2
∑
p∈oi
d(p, OPTD′).
We note that for d(p, OPTD′) ∈ [0, r1) = [0, 1/n)⇒ 1n + d(p, OPTD′) > r1, since r1 = 1/n so∑
p∈o1
1
n
+ d(p, OPTD′) >
∑
p∈o1
r1
⇒ 1 +
∑
p∈o1
d(p, OPTD′) ≥ |o1|r1.
For d(p, OPTD′) ∈ [ri−1, ri) for i 6= 1, since riri−1 = (1+ ǫ), it follows that d(p, OPTD′) > ri1+ǫ , so summing over
all such p we have ∑
d(p,OPTD′ )∈[ti−1,ti)
d(p, OPTD′) >
|oi|ri
1 + ǫ
.
From the last two displays we have
m∑
i=1
|oi|ri ≤ (1 + ǫ)fD′(OPTD′) + 1.
Lemma 5.4. The ideal thresholded cost
∑m
i=1|oi|ri can be related to the achieved thresholded cost
∑m
i=1|ai|ri
by the following inequality
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri ≤ 1− ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
m∑
i=1
(|oi|ri) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
. (4)
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Proof. We define Oi =
∑m
j=i |oj | and Ai =
∑m
j=i |aj |. We then have
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri =
m∑
i=1
Ai(ri − ri−1). (5)
We note that centers in OPTD′ cover n − Oi+1 points at a maximum distance of ri. We also know that
algorithm 2 has already covered n−Ai points at a distance of ri−1 + ti−1
√
d′. It then follows that there are
some k grid points in Gi (snapping the centers in OPTD′ to grid) that cover at least (n−Oi+1)− (n−Ai) =
Ai −Oi+1 uncovered points at a distance of at a distance of ri + ti
√
d′. From the lemma 5.1 guarantee, we
know that
|ai| ≥ (1− ǫ)(Ai −Oi+1)− E,
where E = O
(
k logn
ǫE ·poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
. Since Ai = |ai|+Ai+1, we have that
|ai| ≥
(
1− ǫ
ǫ
)
(Ai+1 −Oi+1)− E
ǫ
⇒ Ai+1 ≤
(
ǫ
1− ǫ
)
|ai|+Oi+1 + E
1− ǫ .
Substituting this in eq. (5), we continue as follows:
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri =
m∑
i=1
Ai(ri − ri−1)
≤
m∑
i=1
((
ǫ
1− ǫ
)
|ai−1|+Oi + E
1− ǫ
)
(ri − ri−1)
=
m∑
i=1
(
ǫ|ai−1|
1− ǫ
)
(ri − ri−1) +
m∑
i=1
|oi|ri + E
1− ǫ (rm − r0)
≤
m∑
i=1
(
ǫ2|ai−1|
1− ǫ
)
ri−1 +
m∑
i=1
|oi|ri + 2E
1− ǫ
⇒
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri
(
1− ǫ
2
1− ǫ
)
≤
m∑
i=1
|oi|ri + 2E
1− ǫ
⇒
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri ≤ 1− ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
m∑
i=1
|oi|ri + 2E
1− ǫ− ǫ2
Substituting the order term E and using that ǫ is bounded away from 1, we get the desired inequality.
Proof of lemma 5.2. We recall that ai = D
′ ∩Bri+ti√d′(Ci). Since D′ ∈ B1(0), and rm = 2, ∪mi=1ai = D′. It
follows that
∑
p∈D′
d(p, grid[p]) =
m∑
i=1
∑
p∈ai
d(p, grid[p])
≤
m∑
i=1
∑
p∈ai
ri + ti
√
d
≤
m∑
i=1
|ai|(ri + ti
√
d)
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≤ (1 + ǫ)
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri
This proves the first inequality. From eq. (3) and eq. (4) we see that
∑m
i=1 |ai|ri obeys the inequality
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri ≤ 1− ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2 ((1 + ǫ)fD′(OPTD′) + 1) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
⇒ (1 + ǫ)
m∑
i=1
|ai|ri ≤
(
1 +
ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
((1 + ǫ)fD′(OPTD′) + 1) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
(6)
with probability 1− γ. Absorbing smaller order terms into the additive error and using lemma 5.2, we get
m∑
i=1
d(p, grid[p]) ≤
(
1 +
3ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
fD′(OPTD′) +O
(
k log n
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
.
In lemma 5.5 we bound the k-means cost of the proxy dataset D′′ in terms of the k-means cost of D′.
Lemma 5.5. With probability 1− γ,
fD′′(OPTD′) ≤
(
4 +
6ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
fD′(OPTD′) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
.
Since D′′ is constructed by using noisy counts of candidate centers, we defer its proof and first derive a
technical lemma to bound the error added by the privacy preserving algorithm.
Lemma 5.6. Let X1, . . . Xk′ be i.i.d. Lap(
1
ǫL
) random variables. Then for any positive constants c1, . . . , ck′ ,
with probability 1− γ,
X :=
k′∑
i=1
ci|Xi| ≤ (log 2)
k′∑
i=1
ci
ǫL
+
2maxi ci
ǫL
log 1/γ.
Proof. The moment generating function of c|X | for X ∼ Lap( 1ǫL ) is ǫLǫL−ct = 11− ctǫL for |ct| < ǫL. It then
follows that for t ≤ ǫLmaxi ci ,
MX(t) =
k′∏
i=1
1
1− citǫL
.
We use the Chernoff bound
P (X > ∆n) = P (etX > et∆n)
≤ E[e
tX ]
et∆n
≤ MX(t)
et∆n
.
If we require that this event occur with probability at most γ, we derive a bound on ∆n that would suffice.
k′∏
i=1
(
1
1− citǫL
)
· 1
et∆n
≤ γ
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⇔
k′∑
i=1
log
(
1
1− citǫL
)
− t∆n ≤ log γ
⇔ t∆n ≥ −
k′∑
i=1
log
(
1− cit
ǫL
)
+ log 1/γ
For citǫL < 0.5, − log
(
1− citǫL
)
< (log 2) citǫL by convexity of − log(1 − x) in the argument x. Restricting t to
[0, ǫL2maxi ci ], we continue.
⇐ t∆n ≥ log 2
k′∑
i=1
cit
ǫL
+ log 1/γ
⇔ ∆n ≥ log 2
k′∑
i=1
ci
ǫL
+
1
t
log 1/γ
Setting t = ǫL2maxi ci , we get the desired result.
Proof of lemma 5.5. In D′′ each grid point occurs with multiplicity n′c = nc +Xc where Xc ∼ Lap
(
2
ǫL
)
.
fD′′(OPTD′) =
∑
p∈D′′
d(p, OPTD′)
=
∑
c∈C
n′cd(c, OPTD′)
=
∑
c∈C
(
ncd(c, argmin
µ∈D′′
d(c, µ)) +Xcd(c, argmin
µ∈D′′
d(c, µ))
)
≤
∑
c∈C
ncd(c, argmin
µ∈OPTD′
d(c, µ)) +
∑
c∈C
|Xc| · 2
Using that points in D′′ are enumerated by running over centers in c ∈ C with multiplicity nc, and by
applying lemma 5.6, we get that with probability 1− γ,
fD′′(OPTD′) ≤
∑
p∈D′
d(grid[p], argmin
µ∈OPTD′
d(grid[p], µ)) +O
(
k logn
ǫ2 · ǫL
)
+O
(
log 1/γ
ǫL
)
≤
∑
p∈D′
2
(
d(grid[p], p) + d(p, argmin
µ∈OPTD′
d(grid[p], µ))
)
+O
(
k logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
.
In the above we drop log 1/γ as it is asymptotically dominated by the other error term for any failure
probability polynomially small in n. Using lemma 5.2 to simplify the first term, we have that with probability
1− 2γ,
fD′′(OPTD′) ≤ 2
(
1 +
3ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
fD′(OPTD′) + 2fD′(OPTD′) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
≤
(
4 +
6ǫ
1− ǫ − ǫ2
)
fD′(OPTD′) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
.
In lemma 5.7 we bound the error incurred on using the k-means solution for the proxy dataset D′′ for
the dataset D′.
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Lemma 5.7. Let A be the clustering algorithm used in line 20 of algorithm 2. If A has the utility guarantee
fS(A(S)) ≤ EM · fS(OPTS) + EA
then
fD′(A(D′′)) ≤ (8EM + 2 + (8EM + 4)ǫ)fD′(OPTD′) + 2EA +O
(
k logn
ǫE
log
kn
γ
)
.
Proof. From the clustering algorithm guarantee we have that
fD′′(A(D′′)) ≤ EM · fD′′(OPTD′′) + EA.
By definition, fD′′(OPTD′′) < fD′′(OPTD′). Substituting the bound from lemma 5.5, we get
fD′′(A(D′′)) ≤
(
8 +
12ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
(EM + 1)fD′(OPTD′) + 2EA +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k log n
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
.
So then
fD′(A(D′′)) =
∑
p∈D′
d(p, argmin
µ∈A(D′′)
d(p, µ))
≤
∑
p∈D′
d(p, argmin
µ∈A(D′′)
d(grid[p], µ))
≤
∑
p∈D′
2
(
d(p, grid[p]) + d(grid[p], argmin
µ∈A(D′′)
d(grid[p], µ))
)
≤

2 ∑
p∈D′
d(p, grid[p])

+ 2fD′′(A(D′′))
≤ 2 ·
(
4 +
6ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
fD′(OPTD′) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k log n
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
+
2EM ·
(
4 +
6ǫ
1− ǫ − ǫ2
)
fD′(OPTD′) +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
+ 2EA
≤
(
8 +
12ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
(EM + 1)fD′(OPTD′) + 2EA +O
(
k logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
.
To complete the utility analysis, we need to account for the projection and scaling as well as the Gaussian
noise added to maintain privacy. In lemma 5.8 we derive an expression for the utility without accounting for
any noise in and theorem 5.9 we derive an expression for the net utility guarantee of algorithm 2.
Lemma 5.8. If we cluster D according to its projected and scaled version D′, we get a set S of size k such
that
fD(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
(
8 +
12ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
(EM + 1)fD(OPTD) + 2(1 + ǫ)∆
2EA+
+O
(
k∆2 log n
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
.
Proof. To scale the data from a ball that lies within a diameter of ∆ to a diameter of 2, we note that the
clustering cost is multiplied by a factor of ∆2/4. To account for the projection we recall that the k-means
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cost can be expressed without explicit reference to the means themselves. We let {D′i : i ∈ [k]} be the
partition of the data D′ into k clusters, where the ith cluster is centered at µ′i and S
′ = {µ′i : i ∈ [k]}.
fD′(S
′) =
∑
i∈[k]
∑
p∈D′i
d(p, µ′i)
=
∑
i∈[k]
∑
p∈D′i
‖p− µ′i‖2
=
∑
i∈[k]
1
|D′i|
∑
p6=q∈D′i
‖p− q‖2.
Since the Johnson Lindenstrauss transform preserves the ℓ2 norm squared within a multiplicative factor of
(1 ± ǫ), it follows from the display above that the cost of clustering D according to its image D′ is at most
(1 + ǫ)fD′(S
′). Denoting the cluster centers derived in this fashion by S, this gives us
fD(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
(
2 +
4ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
(EM + 1)∆
2fD′(OPTD′) +
∆2EA
2
+
O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
⇒ fD(S) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
(
8 +
12ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
(EM + 1)fD(OPTD) + 2(1 + ǫ)∆
2EA+
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
,
where we use that ∆
2
4 fD′(OPTD′) = fD(OPTD).
Theorem 5.9. Algorithm 2 returns a set of points S˜ such that
E
[
fD(S˜)
]
≤ (1 + ǫ)
(
8 +
12ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
(EM + 1)fD(OPTD) + 2(1 + ǫ)∆
2EA+
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
+O
(
k∆2
√
d log 1/δG
ǫG
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn/δG
ǫG
)
.
Proof. The final set of points returned, denoted S˜, is obtained by using algorithm 1. From the statement
of theorem 2.6, we know that for the ith cluster if |Di| ≥ A
(
1
ǫG
log
(
nk
δG
))
with sufficiently large constant
A then with probability 1 − 1kn , algorithm 1 returns µi + gi where gi is sampled from N(0, σ2) for some
σ < 4∆ǫG|Di|
√
2 ln(4/δG). We let c = 4
√
2 ln(4/δG) so that σ <
c∆
ǫG|Di| . We can upper bound the clustering
cost by assuming that cluster sets remain the same even with the noisy means, and then add up the cost
cluster by cluster.
fD(S˜) =
∑
p∈D
d(p, S˜)
≤
∑
i∈[k]
∑
p∈Di
d(p, µ˜i)
∑
p∈Di
d(p, µ˜i) =
∑
p∈Di
‖x− µ˜i‖2
=
∑
p∈Di
‖p− µi + gi‖2
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=
∑
p∈Di
〈p− µi + gi, p− µi + gi〉
=

∑
p∈Di
‖p− µi‖2 +
〈∑
p∈Di
p− µi, gi
〉
+
∑
p∈Di
‖gi‖2


= fDi({µi}) + 〈(|Di| − 1)µi, gi〉+
∑
i
|Di|‖gi‖2,
where in the last step we use that
∑
p∈Di p = |Di|µ. If |Di| ≥ A
(
1
ǫG
log
(
nk
δG
))
for sufficiently large constant
A, then taking the expectation, we get
⇒ E

∑
p∈Di
d(p, S˜)

 ≤ fDi({µi}) + |Di|E

 d∑
j=1
‖gi‖2


≤ fDi({µi}) + |Di|
(
c∆
|Di|ǫG
)2
d
≤ fDi({µi}) +
c2∆2
|Di|ǫ2G
d.
If |Di| ≥ c
√
d
ǫG
then this is at most fDi({µi})+ c∆
2
ǫG
√
d. On the other hand, if |Di| < c
√
d
ǫG
, we observe that the
clustering cost fDi(µ˜i) can be at most
c
√
d
ǫG
∆2 unconditionally. Similarly if |Di| = O
(
1
ǫG
log
(
nk
δG
))
, then the
clustering cost fDi(µ˜i) can be at most O
(
1
ǫG
log
(
nk
δG
)
∆2
)
. With probability 1 − 1n the large cluster cost
bound holds for all clusters simultaneously and we then have
E

∑
p∈D
d(p, S˜)

 ≤ ∑
i∈[k]
E

∑
p∈Di
d(p, µ˜i)


≤
(
1− 1
n
) ∑
i:|Di|≥
√
d
fDi({µi}) +
c∆2
ǫG
√
d

 + 1
n
∆2n
+
∑
i:|Di|<
√
d
c
√
d
ǫG
∆2 +
∑
i:|Di|< 8ǫG log
(
2nk
δG
)
O
(
1
ǫG
log
(
nk
δG
)
∆2
)
≤
(∑
i∈k
fDi({µi}) + k
c∆2
ǫG
√
d
)
+∆2 + k∆2
c
√
d
ǫG
+O
(
k
ǫG
log
(
nk
δG
)
∆2
)
= fD(S) +O
(
k∆2
√
d log 1/δG
ǫG
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn/δG
ǫG
)
.
Substituting the bound on fD(S) from lemma 5.8, we get
E
[
fD(S˜)
]
≤ (1 + ǫ)
(
8 +
12ǫ
1− ǫ− ǫ2
)
(EM + 1)fD(OPTD) + 2(1 + ǫ)∆
2EA+
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫE · poly(ǫ) log
n
γ
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn
ǫL · poly(ǫ)
)
+O
(
k∆2
√
d log 1/δG
ǫG
)
+O
(
k∆2 logn/δG
ǫG
)
.
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6 Privacy
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 6.1. Algorithm 2 is
(
eǫE ln δ
−1
E
2 + ǫL + ǫG, δE + δG
)
-differentially private.
From the basic (theorem 2.4) and parallel (theorem 2.5) composition laws of differential privacy and
the privacy guarantees of the Laplace mechanism (lemma 2.3) and algorithm 1 (theorem 2.6) most of the
expression for the bound on privacy loss claimed in this result follows relatively straightforwardly. To bound
the privacy loss incurred in the calls to algorithm 3, we adapt a technique from [10]. We use this technique
in the following lemma to show that the privacy loss when using the exponential mechanism many times
successively can be bounded as an expression of the sum of expected gains in the cover. For the set cover
function this sum of expected gains can be shown to decay exponentially using lemma 2.9, which leads to a
strong bound on the privacy loss.
Lemma 6.2. The subroutine line 8-line 12 of algorithm 2 that constructs set of centers C (over m iterations)
is
(
eǫE ln δ
−1
E
2 , δE
)
-differentially private
Proof. Let A and B be two neighbouring datasets, i.e. A△B = {I}. To show that this subroutine (denoted
A) is (ǫ, δ) differentially private, we need to show that the ratio P (A(A) = C)/P (A(B) = C) is bounded
from above by eǫ with probability 1 − δ, where C is an arbitrary sequence of grid points c1, . . . , ckm/ǫ that
might be picked in the thresholded max-cover subroutine.
P (A(A) = C)
P (A(B) = C) =
km/ǫ∏
i=1
P (A(A)i = ci|c1, . . . , ci−1)
P (A(B)i = ci|c1, . . . , ci−1)
P (A(A)i = ci|c1, . . . , ci−1) =
exp
(
ǫE |cover[ci]|
2
)
∑
g exp
(
ǫE |cover[g]|
2
)
⇒ P (A(A) = C)
P (A(B) = C) =
km/ǫ∏
i=1
exp
(
ǫE |coverA[ci]|
2
)
exp
(
ǫE |coverB [ci]|
2
) · km/ǫ∏
i=1
∑
g exp
(
ǫE |coverB [g]|
2
)
∑
g exp
(
ǫE |coverA[g]|
2
) .
If A\B = {I} then we see that the second factor is at most 1 and the first factor is at most exp ( ǫE2 ), since
coverA[ci]\coverB[ci] can be at most the data point I, and that too for at most one index i, since cover counts
only yet uncovered data points. Inversely if B\A = {I}, then the first factor is at most 1 and we need to
bound the second factor. We observe that this ratio of sums can be written as an expectation by factoring
out the indicator of I as follows:
km/ǫ∏
i=1
∑
g exp
(
ǫE |coverB [g]|
2
)
∑
g exp
(
ǫE |coverA[g]|
2
) = km/ǫ∏
i=1
E
g∼exp
(
ǫE |coverA[g]|
2
)
[
exp
(
ǫE1I∈coverB [g]
2
)]
≤
km/ǫ∏
i=1
Eg∼·
[
1 + e · ǫE1I∈coverB [g]
2
]
=
km/ǫ∏
i=1
1 +
eǫEE[1I∈coverB [g]]
2
≤
km/ǫ∏
i=1
exp
(
eǫEE[1I∈coverB [g]]
2
)
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= exp


eǫE
km/ǫ∑
i=1
E[1I∈coverB [g]]
2

 .
To bound the sum of expectations that occurs in the exponent, we use lemma 2.9 with Ri = 1I∈coverB [ci]
and pi = E[Ri] if I has not been picked by the (i − 1)th round and Ri = Ber(0) otherwise. We see that
Zj =
∏j
i=1(1 − Ri) then simply indicates the event that I has not been covered by the jth round. With
these definitions,
∑km/ǫ
i=1 piZi =
∑km/ǫ
i=1 E[1I∈coverB [g]] and
P

km/ǫ∑
i=1
E[1I∈coverB [g]] > q

 < exp(−q).
If
km/ǫ∑
i=1
E[1I∈coverB [g]] < q then we say that the sequence C is q-good. If a sequence is not q-good, it is called
q-bad. If we let q = ln δ−1E , we see that the probability of an arbitrary sequence being ln δ
−1
E -good is at least
1− δE . This means that with probability 1− δE ,
P (A(A) = C)
P (A(B) = C) ≤ exp
(
eǫE ln δ
−1
E
2
)
.
Putting everything together, we see that this subroutine satisfies
(
eǫE ln δ
−1
E
2 , δE
)
-differential privacy.
Proof of theorem 6.1. We divide the privacy analysis into two halves; first, we bound the loss in privacy that
occurs when constructing the proxy dataset D′′. From lemma 6.2 we know that in the m calls to algorithm 3
the net loss in privacy is (
eǫE log δ
−1
E
2 , δE). In the calculation of noisy counts we see that two neighbouring
datasets can only differ in their true counts by 1 unit at one center of C, from whence it follows that the ℓ1
sensitivity of the tuple of all counts is 1 unit; this justifies the choice of parameter in the Laplace mechanism.
Using basic composition theorem 2.4 along with the privacy loss bound for the Laplace mechanism lemma 2.3
we see that the net loss in privacy on releasing the proxy dataset D′′ is
(
eǫE log δ
−1
E
2 + ǫL, δE
)
.
We now have that D′′ is publicly known and that the low-dimensional domain can be partitioned by
identifying each point in the domain with the closest point in the set returned by the non-private clustering
algorithm used (a Voronoi diagram).
In the second half of the analysis we use the parallel composition theorem (theorem 2.5) of [18] along
with algorithm 1 (theorem 2.6). Since each application of algorithm 1 on the separate clusters is (ǫG, δG)-
differentially private, we apply parallel composition (theorem 2.5) to conclude that the net privacy loss over
all k applications is still (ǫG, δG).
Using basic composition we conclude that algorithm 2 is
(
eǫE log δ
−1
E
2 + ǫL + ǫG, δE + δG
)
-differentially
private.
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7 Experiments
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Figure 1: Empirical comparison of algorithm 2 and the private k-means clustering algorithm from [4]
In this section we present an experimental comparison between algorithm 2, the differentially private k-means
clustering algorithm from [4], and the non-private Lloyd’s algorithm. Although there are other works with
strong theoretical guarantees (such as [13]), we are not aware of any implementation for those methods. The
comparison here is done for two datasets; a synthetic dataset reproducing the construction in [4] and the
MNIST dataset [14].
The empirical results shown here for Balcan et al.’s algorithm [4] come largely from their MATLAB
implementation available on Github. Some corrections were made to the implementation of [4]; although the
pseudocode uses a noisy count of the cluster sizes when computing the noisy average of the clusters found
their implementation used the non-private exact count. We replaced this subroutine with algorithm 1 to use
the best method we know for privately computing the average.
Implementation details: The privacy parameters were set to ǫ = 1 and δ = n−1.5 for both algorithms.
For each algorithm and dataset we let the number of centers k = 2, 6, 10, 14 and 18. Our implementation of the
algorithm, similar to [4], projects to a smaller subspace of dimension size log(n)/2 rather than O(log(n)/ǫ2)
- note that this does not have any effect upon the privacy guarantee.
At the conclusion of both algorithms, we run one round of differentially private Lloyd’s algorithm; adding
this call to the differentially private Lloyd’s yielded better empirical results for both the algorithm of [4] and
ours. The addition of these rounds of Lloyd’s requires adjusting privacy parameters by a constant factor
but otherwise does not affect the privacy guarantees of the original algorithms. Although [4] satisfy (ǫ, 0)
differential privacy and hence use the Laplace mechanism for their noisy average, we replaced this step with
the noisyAVG routine of [19] for a fair comparison. The non-private Lloyd’s algorithm was executed with 10
iterations. Figure 1 records the averages and standard deviation over five runs of each experiment.
Datasets: The synthetic dataset is comprised of 50000 points randomly sampled from a mixture of 64
Gaussians in R100. The MNIST dataset uses the raw pixels; it is comprised of 70000 points with 784 features
each.
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Results: As can be seen in fig. 1, our algorithm achieves a lower k-means objective score than that of
[4] for both the synthetic Dataset as well as the MNIST dataset. Similar to the experimental results in
[4], increasing the number of centers results in a decrease in the cost in the non-private algorithm but did
not result in a concomitant decrease in the cost of the private algorithms. This behavior suggests that
the algorithms are limited by their additive errors and that perhaps further decreasing them even in the
constants would improve the gap compared with their non-private counterpart.
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